**Orientalism**

**Link---Russia**

**In the era of Western modernity, geographies are no longer physical, but imaginative ideological divides. Their portrayal of the irrational Russia is an orientalist security discourse that heightens tensions and makes conflict inevitable.**

**Blachford 20**, Kevin Blachford (PhD) is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy., (Kevin, “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia” in Comparative Strategy, 39:4, 354-367, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Russian culture as a source of conflict and orientalism

Edward Said’s seminal study, Orientalism,19 provided an account of how **Western cultural identity** is shaped, formed and defined through comparison and contrast to an Eastern orient. For Said, the orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its **contrasting image**, **idea**, **personality** [and] **experience**.” 20 Said’s groundbreaking study showed the West’s ideological suppositions in viewing the orient. Although originally developed from the colonial era, orientalism illustrates how the West defines itself and its view of others. Orientalism is a view based on an “**imaginative geography**” and can be used to understand how the West portrays the East.21 Orientalism provides a framework to understand cultural constructs and purported differences.22 In this case, the following study looks to the othering of Russia as an Eastern power. Western portrayals of the East have shaped identities and culture, but “crucially, **it is not the actual, geographic East and West** (wherever located) that is at issue” it is the **portrayal** of distinctive and opposing cultures.23 Russian imperial expansion in the 19th century, has itself, often been a source of orientalism within the work of Russian geographers, and anthropologists, coming into contact with people in Central Asia.24 However, in contemporary politics, Russia is increasingly described in orientalist terms that helps to otherize Russia as a distinctive culture that differs to a liberal democratic West. The following section argues that it is **cultural differences** that are seen to be a **primary cause** of geopolitical tensions.

Geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West are commonly understood in cultural terms. This goes beyond an examination of differing national interests, to become an **ideological divide** between a **liberal democratic West** and an **irrational Russian East**. The Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was often expressed in ideological terms. Russia was portrayed in the Cold War as an oriental enemy based on godless communism against America’s liberal democracy.25 What is significant about the portrayal of the opposing sides in the Cold War is that cultural explanations were used to explain state behavior. The Soviet Union was seen as an irrational enemy that was more likely to use nuclear weapons.26 The Cold War conflict was also viewed as an “irreconcilable struggle between two fundamentally different value systems.” American culture was celebrated for its embracing of **personal freedom**, while the Soviets were understood as an **oppressive empire**.27 Since the end of the Cold War, the West has assumed that tensions would disappear and Russia would become more “Western.” Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea have led to the revival of tensions, but crucially, Russian culture is again seen to be a major cause for conflict. The fall of the Berlin Wall led the West to assume that “as Russia became more prosperous it would become more like other European countries.” 28 The post-Cold War era saw an ideological wave of support for a **Fukuyama-esque future** in which Western style liberal democracy would spread inexorably across the globe. Underpinning these views was an ideological belief in the **evolution of progress** and a triumphalist understanding of **Western modernity**.29 Liberal scholars in **IR** have continued to claim that “there is ultimately **one path to modernity**.” 30 This ideological understanding of politics in evolutionary terms views an American West and a liberal international order as the highest form of modernity. Russia’s own interests and understandings of political order can therefore be dismissed because of “Russian backwardness.” 31

The triumphalist post-Cold War mood led **liberal scholars of IR** to argue that the West and Europe was in a fundamental new era. The EU was celebrated for achieving a Kantian Peace,32 having created a new approach to international politics through acting as a **“civilian”** 33 and **“normative”** power.34 Conflict and war within Europe was believed to have been all but essentially eradicated. The political order of European security based on international institutions and collaboration was celebrated for creating a Europe “whole, free and at peace.” 35 Some scholars even went so far as to claiming Europe had moved into a new historical era through creating “postClausewitzian political cultures” that openly questioned “the utility of force.” 36 Russia’s own willingness to use force in defence of its national interests has therefore caused disbelief amongst elites within Europe. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea caught European elites by “surprise” 37 and led to criticisms of Western elites being caught “napping.” 38 The end of the Cold War created a Western ideology, which believed in a “prolonged sense of inevitability about Russia rejoining the West.” 39 Russia’s use of force in defence of its interests led one observer to declare the West is “discovering that Russia’s understanding of events, its discourse, methods and calculus of risk differ from its own.” 40 The annexation of Crimea appeared to show that Western triumphalism had misunderstood Russian culture and identity, that the West had simply “got Russia wrong.” 41

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its **involvement in** the politics of **Ukraine** has been explained largely through a cultural lens. According to Mark Galeotti, Russia believes that it is fighting a “political” war and “faces an existential cultural” threat from the “West.” 42 In trying to understand the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s use of **hybrid warfare** is explained as originating from a particular “**ideological vision** and political ambition” 43 and from the “worldview” of Russian elites and society.44 Russia’s actions in Ukraine are also attributed to the way the Russia’s leadership “look at the world.” 45 Anatol Lieven argues that overused analogies comparing Russia’s actions to Nazi Germany also imply that Russia’s leadership is a “force of absolute evil, drawing on deeply rooted, malevolent elements of Russian culture.” 46 It is the “**culture**” of Russian society and its elites that is uniquely blamed for “the return of geopolitics” to Europe.47 Analysts have rushed to also explain these tensions as a new “East-West” confrontation48 in which Russia’s non-Western culture has exacerbated the **divide between NATO and Russia**.

This East-West divide continues an **orientalist tendency** within **Western security debates**. The idea of a “West at war with an East conceived as radically other is pervasive and longstanding” within **political discourse**.49 The War on Terror is just one recent example of a long propensity within Western security discourse to fall into an orientalist perspective. But it is during conflict and warfare that an orientalist perspectives frame an “us” versus “them.” Political discussions on the War on Terror often portrayed a “law abiding, Christian and Western civilization” as threatened by an irrational Eastern enemy that was **“ever-resistant to modernity.”** 50 In trying to explain the return of geopolitical competition to Europe, there is an orientalist tendency to see Western states as **acting rationally**, responding to incentives; while Russian foreign policy is shaped by a resistance to modernity and the Russian culture of its elites, or by a **primordial instinct** traced to its national character and the weight of its history.51 As the following section explores, Western political discourse toward Russia is often framed through this orientalist lens.

**War is not a dispute mechanism, but a cultural act securing the Western identity against the exotic, yet dangerous Other---their portrayal of Russia’s “irrationality” increases militarization and makes peace-making impossible.**

**Blachford 20**, Kevin Blachford (PhD) is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy., (Kevin, “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia” in Comparative Strategy, 39:4, 354-367, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The subject of international relations (IR) has been defined by questions of war and peace, and the foundations of the discipline can be traced to debates on why states go to war. Cultural explanations of war and culture as a source of conflict has also become a major strand of research.1 Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations went so far as to suggest that cultural distinctions would define war and conflict for the 21st century.2 Understanding war through **cultural identities** demonstrates how groups **“other”** the opposing side and how war can play a **constitutive role** in **social and political relations**. **War itself**, can also be understood as a **cultural act** in which the traits of a society are “violently affirmed.” 3 However, **the way IR treats the concept of war** has recently come into criticism for its **Eurocentric ontology**.4 Eurocentric ideas and historiographies have **shaped** and informed **our understanding** of conflict. War as a cultural act can also create a distinct **division of identity** between “us” and “them.” This is evident in the way **Western wars**, led by the US and its European allies, are interpreted in very different ways to other actors. **Liberal democracies** regularly portray their wars as conflicts against irrational aggressors.5 While non-Western war is seen as **“criminal”** in its intent or **irrational** in its justifications.6

In portraying warfare through a cultural lens, war often becomes a “**potent site of orientalism**” where “the West” is defined through opposition to “the East.” 7 It is a perspective that exaggerates cultural differences and often views other cultures, as **exotic**, **uncivilized** and **dangerous**. Orientalist understandings of war portray **conflict between** distinct **identities** of West and East. Western warfare is understood through overwhelming firepower, surgical strikes and swift action relying on advanced technology,8 while Eastern warfare is portrayed in orientalist terms. The East becomes seen as a source of **irrational zealots** who embrace **fanaticism** and **primeval violence**.9 War creates an **existential crisis that shapes self-identity** and this can be **illustrated through** the **tensions between Russia and the West**. As this paper shows, Russia’s recent wars in Georgia (2008), **Ukraine** (2014) and Syria (2015-) have helped shape Western and Russian discourse as competing identities and cultures. Specifically, Russia is often portrayed in orientalist terms as an Eastern power that has rejected Western values. The following paper argues that orientalist portrayals of Russia **limit our understanding** of these conflicts and leads to **increased militarization** as Russian culture is seen as **incompatible** with Western liberal values.

Historical patterns of geopolitical competition between the US and Russia have often been understood through their respective **competing identities** and cultural explanations of contemporary Russia continue to be mired in cliches, stereotypes and **caricatures**.10 Stereotypes of **Putin “playing chess”** 11 or “facing up to the bear” 12 also continue to **shape Western discourse** about tensions with Russia. Understandings of Russia then become **mired** in attempts to explain Russian foreign policy as **irrational**, **deceptive** and **non-Western**. This **orientalist perspective** deserves to be investigated because Russian culture is widely seen as a primary cause of conflict and tension with the West. Russia is accused of following a “perpetual” and “historical pattern,” 13 in which Russia’s actions can be understood largely through its history, **national identity** and its expansive **geography**. The culture of the Russian leadership and its “way of war” 14 are viewed as a significant source of tension with the West and one of the major causes of the Georgia15 and Ukraine crises.16 These cultural explanations of the tensions between the two sides portray Russia as diverging from Western norms.17 This creates an **othering of Russia** as it is portrayed as the “**West’s mirror image**” and antithesis.18 Orientalist perspectives **limit the possibilities of negotiation** as the othering of Russia leads to an **increasingly militarized dispute** viewed in cultural terms in which competing identities are seen as radically different and incompatible.

**Link---Russia---Capitalism**

**The Western cosmology as the center of the globe reproduces psychically and racially motivated violence against the Russian Other. Fascism is not the enemy of capitalism, but an endpoint. The real enemy is leftist uprising.**

**Charles 22**, Hampton Institute, (Julien, “Resurrecting the Ghouls: On the West's History of Hating Russians and Rehabilitating Nazis”, <https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/tag/orientalism>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The character in the novel embodied a version of Edward Said’s **Orientalism**, a process by which the West **caricatures** other regions, nations, and people in cartoonish and sophomoric ways. The better to understand them at a glance. Almost like a kind of intellectual shorthand by which to characterize and dismiss entire populations. Perform conceptual violence on them until they can be shunted into a shape that slides neatly into a western man’s conception of the world. **Fits the Western cosmology**, in which the U.S. and Europe shine as lodestars in a firmament of flickering blight. Everything in the heavens is of course in desperate need of guidance from the **western polestar**.

Examples of the dynamic of Orientalism are particularly rife in Hollywood. Countless series and movies have pitted pious Americans against a raft of crackpot Latinos, Slavs, Arabs, Persians, and Asians bent on genocide, world domination, and numberless other monomaniacal schemes. There’s of course no small amount of projection at work here in the fictional stylings of “the best minds of [our] generation”, as Ginsberg put it.

Not unlike the Kepler book, the Tom Cruise Jack Reacher films capitalize on the by now threadbare trope of a Soviet psychopath set loose in the naive and peaceable democracies of the West. The Zec is a man who escaped or survived the gulags in Siberia to wreak havoc on the West. In one scene, he describes how he once gnawed off a few fingers to avoid working in Siberian sulfur mines. A man of such exceptional capacities is no doubt useful to certain organizations, he muses. The Zec then encourages one of his low-level thugs to chew off his thumb as a show of fidelity, or some such deranged proof. The man—human, all too human—cannot do it and is summarily executed. The bloodless Zec then waxes psychopathic, wondering why westerners are so weak.

Observe the set pieces in the Jennifer Lawrence vehicle Red Sparrow. Scenes from the West are well-lit and overflowing with human emotion; scenes from behind the “iron curtain” are dimly lit, drab in color, stylistically old-world, barren of human empathy. In short, thoroughly depressing. Of course, as part of Lawrence’s character Dominika’s training in demolishing her human emotions (weaknesses all) and steeling herself in the arts of pitiless manipulation, she must appear naked before her class and satisfy the lust of a man who previously assaulted her.

**CHRONIC RESENTMENTS**

These are caricatures of Russians who evidently have been thoroughly dehumanized by life in the USSR. What has really dehumanized these characters is the **propaganda** which invented them.

Few events ignite this kind of Orientalism more than a war or proxy war with Russia, America’s **bete noire**. Despite the fact that the wall has been down for 30 years. Despite the fact that the West enjoyed an extended period of unrestrained looting in the Former Soviet Republics. During which time mortality rates skyrocketed for citizens of those fledgling states, thanks principally to the loss of the generous social supports that underpinned their Soviet economies. Despite the fact that Vladimir Putin is an avowed neoliberal who has repeatedly sought deeper integration with Europe and America, like a stepchild desperate to claim his birthright among a welter of siblings. Despite all this, Putin’s patriotic desire to reconstitute Russia as a viable economic and military power has damned him irreparably in the eyes of the West. He is like Kepler’s killer, the manifestation of undiluted evil. Except that Putin is real.

All this comes from a long lineage of **Russophobia**. It dates back to the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, which stirred fears of Russian plots to conquer Europe; to subsequent paranoia by British colonialists that Russia would steal the Indian subcontinent from its grasp; to the war to unseat the Bolsheviks and blistering responses to stories of mass slaughter under Soviet rule. In 1944, Hitler described Russians thusly, “These are not human beings: they are beasts from the Asiatic steppes, and the battle I am leading against them is the battle for the dignity of the people of Europe.” This view summarized the ideology behind Germany’s plan to murder 100 million Russians after the defeated the USSR. Likewise, we rarely hear that one of the small handful of groups energetically targeted for liquidation by the Nazis were communists. The Russians sacrificed 27 million people fighting off fascism. This loss is also infrequently highlighted.

The **McCarthyite paranoia** was a particularly acute instance of this chronic phobia. One can catch a whiff of the age-old bigotry in the propaganda of the present moment. The reflexive aggression toward Russia action in Ukraine (a recent article in The Times (UK) was entitled, **“Russia’s casual savagery is seared into its soul”**) This latest surge of bile seems in part an explosion of **unresolved angst** from the Russophobia of the Trump years, and perhaps a hundred years prior, though partially diffused by the fall of the wall. Yet it was still there even in the post-wall melees of capitalist looting under the doddering oversight of the Pushkin-quoting boozer Boris Yeltsin. Russians, Muscovites mostly, were freshly depicted as amoral, thieving mafiosi seduced by the flash of capital, the men brutal grotesques and the women biddable jades. Little was made of the valueless cosmos into which they’d been hurled by the blitzkrieg of capital on a society not remotely prepared for it.

(Much like the diagnosis of mental health in the West, problems of post-fall Russians were and are localized in the person, in the soul of a people, rarely traced to their societal causes. The New York Times just released a series on the “Inner Pandemic” of mental health issues, though it spends little time focusing on the circumstances that generated these crises, and which it enthusiastically supported.)

**Even today** one finds strains of the old **Hitlerian trope** coursing through the **western mainstream**. Recently on Germany’s ZDF channel, a guest of the Markus Lanz Show reminded viewers, with a slim smile, that, **“Even if Russians look European, they are not European.”** She rambled on incoherently about the Slavic view of death and noted that, **“They have no concept of a liberal, post-modern life.”** She may as well have said they were beasts from the Asiatic steppes and referred viewers to the Jack Reacher movie. After which, perhaps, they might donate to the latest national purity fund.

This seems to be part unhinged racism, but also a **psychological necessity** for enemies in nation-states. And **one wonders if race isn’t utilized to that end**. And whether this psychological need springs from a desire for national purpose, or more from an **unrelenting need of capital** for new markets—and the geospatial requirements that go with it. Surely the historical Lebensraum looms large behind modern geopolitical conflicts.

**ADDICTED TO CONFLICT**

But it isn’t just the **xenophobic fear** of Slavic people. There’s another element at work here. One is reminded of Colin Powell, former leader of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and dissembler nonpareil—before the U.N. Security Council. He once told a reporter that he feared he was **“running out of enemies”** in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. He was unwittingly disclosing a **clandestine principle** of **Washington foreign policy**. Namely, that it must always have an enemy. It cannot conceive a world of peaceful inhabitants, engaged in serene market exchange, celebrating a peace dividend while occasionally reminding new generations of the perils of conflict. This is not a conceit in the mental universe of the planners of **American hegemony**, be they retired generals on media networks, cabinet lieutenants sketching hemispheric takeovers, or well-compensated scriveners in beltway think tanks. And certainly not among the lurid corridors of K Street defense lobbyists. **If Putin did not exist, Washington would have invented him**. Much as they invented, to a surprising degree, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda henchmen.

More often than not, the enemy must be cut from whole cloth. They do not ordinarily present themselves. Few countries are interested in going to war with the United States. At worst most nations are disinterested in submitting themselves to American rule, which manifests in numberless ways, a protean ogre extending its tentacles across the globe. Soft power, hard power, **invisible power**. Be it the petro dollar and the SWIFT system that places a subject nation under the perpetual threat of American sanctions. (A form of economic colonialism.) Be it **bilateral security** arrangements that infiltrate the country with U.S. military personnel and ensnare it in long-term weapons contracts with beltway defense contractors. (A form of military subjugation.) Be it onerous and odious loan agreements with Bretton Woods institutions that enslave generations of citizens to corrupt banks of the global North. (A form of vassalage.) From which those citizens’ meager avenues of escape include metastasizing debt service and consequent debt deflation, firesales of national patrimony, or the trauma of default, runaway inflation, and economic collapse. Choose wisely.

Rather than being enemies of the American state, such nations would really rather be left alone. To experiment with alternative economic models including socialism and its various hybrids. To trade in local currencies. To align in regional economic blocs. But this option–attempting to implement an economic structure other than western neoliberalism–is **anathema to Washington**. Just ask Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Brazil, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and any other nation that wishes to forge its own path.

THE REAL ENEMY

Which brings us to the real enemy of the United States. Despite reports to the contrary, it is **not fascism**. Fascism is merely an **end-point of capitalism**, which will almost assuredly emerge wherever capitalism is practiced in unregulated and unrepentant fashion. As middle class wealth craters, however broadly, and extreme wealth and privilege expands, however narrowly, it will require force to generate compliance within a resentful and restive population. We are **witnessing this transition** in the West **right now**.

All this to say that, no, fascism was never the primary nemesis. **The real enemy is communism**. Western capital cannot abide the notion of a workers' state full of nationalized enterprises committed to the general welfare. One which deprioritizes the profit motive and tars it with the stigma of avarice and usury. This is and has always been Washington’s worst-case scenario, which it watched materialize in the Bolshevik Revolution, a knife in the side of capital that drew blood for 74 years, and which it tried hysterically to end all the while.

Not even the shameful scourge of Nazism rising up in the heart of civilized Europe was enough to lift fascism above communism as public enemy number one. As John Steppling notes in an excellent essay on the rehabilitation of fascism, Arthur Schweitzer, author of Big Business in the Third Reich, says that many German businessmen saw virulent anti-semitism as little more than a form of “economic policy reform.”

It is instructive to read works like The Splendid Blond Beast, which outlines the myriad deceptions of the postwar era of supposed deNazification in Western Europe. As it turns out, Washington was **torn** on the prosecution of Nazi war crimes. Although Frederick Roosevelt and others supported harsh punishment, helped establish Nuremberg and sent principled judges like Robert Jackson, others like powerful Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles and his Secretary of State brother John Foster Dulles sought to **shield German** industrialists and **military officers**, all deeply complicit and enthusiastic collaborators in the Nazi extermination campaigns.

Then there was **Operation Paperclip**, a full program dedicated to **repatriating Nazis** in the United States and installing them in key posts in pivotal internationalist institutions like the UN. And **Nato’s** alleged **role in Operation Gladio**, code name for a series of stay behind secret armies committed to armed resistance, acts of subversion, and terror, that were to be activated in the event of an invasion of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact nations, something never on the books in Moscow, but alive in the feverish imagination of beltway anti-communists. These dispersed embedded and hastily assembled paramilitaries were actually left behind to agitate against and prevent the rise of leftist (see communist) political blocs. They operated in Italy, Greece, France, Germany, Portugal and across Northern Europe. Nato, the CIA, and various European intelligence agencies were not about to watch Western Europe go communist regardless of what the democratized masses aberrantly desired.

Much of this **history suggests** that the **underlying need of capitalism** for new markets is primary, and perhaps that **race is a tool** leveraged to **rationalize** what is at bottom base exploitation. Hence our general acceptance of fascism in Ukraine and hysteria against Russia.

**Link---Ukraine**

**Their critical discourse of Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine is a hypocritical ploy that invisiblizes Western proxy wars, propaganda, and covert operations and constructs the West as a rational ruler of norms.**

**Blachford 20**, Kevin Blachford (PhD) is a Lecturer of International Relations at the Baltic Defence College, Estonia and the Estonian School of Diplomacy., (Kevin, “Western orientalism and the threat from Russia” in Comparative Strategy, 39:4, 354-367, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1772625>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The **fighting in Ukraine** and the annexation of Crimea has been interpreted as a “frontal challenge to the post-Cold War European regional order.” 57 Russia’s actions created **surprise** and **shock** for analysts and policy makers alike, but there have been few serious investigations into Russia’s strategic decisions. Instead, **Western public discourse** has followed an **orientalist trend** in blaming an **irrational leadership** and its **Eastern culture**. The use of force by Russia is also seen as uniquely linked to **Putin**’s leadership. The Ukraine and Georgia crisis is blamed on Putin’s “unique response” 58 and Putin’s “choice.” 59 There seems **little attempt** to explore either the workings of the Russian leadership or to consider in more detail why Russia chose to intervene. Instead, there is a tendency to embrace **simplistic arguments** blaming Putin’s “unconstrained, erratic adventurism.” 60 Western analysts argue Putin’s “surprise policy decisions,” and his “rashness,” “have astounded even expert analysis.” 61 What is significant about the attempts to blame solely Putin is that he is seen as **uniquely responsible**. Putin as the sole figure involved is then portrayed as an “ideologue” 62 and as a “gambler.” 63 His actions are not seen as the rational choice of a leader responding to a realpolitik environment. However, counter arguments have been made which show Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine was not an irrational opportunistic gamble, but an attempt to coerce Kiev into negotiations.64 But while such alternative explanations have been discussed in academic publications they have not been widely covered within the Western media.

The Ukraine crisis has, however, been widely covered in the media for its use of **hybrid warfare**. The surprise and confusion these events created within Western political commentary was intertwined with an **orientalist perspective** that sought to highlight Russia’s **cultural differences** to the West. **Hybrid warfare** has been described as a conflict between “East and West.” 65 What is significant in this portrayal is that Russia’s hybrid warfare is then viewed in omnipotent terms which exaggerates Russia’s power and ability.66 Western observers have long **demonized** Eastern tactics in war as **irrational**, **deceptive** and **underhanded**.67 In describing Russia’s actions, Western analysts repeat this formula by accusing Russia of using “shadowy tactics” 68 of being “sneaky” 69 and using tactics based on “deceit.” 70 Hybrid warfare is further interpreted with reference to the Ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu.71 The reputation of Sun Tzu as an Eastern general willing to use deception and secrecy to win battles is then compared to Russia’s own use of asymmetric warfare.72 But crucially, this historical analogy devolves further into an orientalist perspective when Russia is accused of being, not just a “sneaky” Easterner, but by **not playing by “the rules.”** 73 Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare is not interpreted as a **rational response** to material or strategic constraints, but is blamed for being **deceptive**.

The significance of these critiques is that Russia is accused of not acting in a manner acceptable to the West. Russia’s hybrid war is understood as breaking the rules and as Martin Zapfe argues, Russia “seems to have rejected the established Western playbook.” 74 It is the **“strategic culture”** of Russia which is seen to be at fault in rejecting Western ways of war.75 These portrayals of a Russian East as enigmatic and dangerous, diverging from Western norms shows an orientalist perspective.76 Looking to Sun Tzu in order to understand contemporary military strategy can be illuminating. But what makes these perspectives problematic is the way Russia is viewed as acting in a way that the West would never contemplate. For example, Russia is accused of being uniquely better suited to hybrid warfare because of Putin’s “central guiding authority.” 77 This **ignores** that the concept of hybrid warfare originated with the US78 and **Western uses of** deception, covert tactics or **proxy fighters becomes** essentially **ignored**. Rod Thornton argues further that, “the basic problem across the board is that liberal democracies have an inherent distaste for producing anything at the strategic level that resembles propaganda or could be classed as psychological warfare.” 79 The **long US history of propaganda** and **covert war** in both the Cold War and the War on Terror is therefore negated and **exempt from consideration**. As Rory Cormac and Richard Aldrich have argued, much of **IR**, “offers a **simplistic view of secrecy**” and Western covert action by taking “plausible deniability at face value.” 80 Attempts to critically analyze Russia’s use of asymmetric warfare have therefore failed to fully engage with the West’s own use of covert warfare.

**Their call out of the Ukrainian invasion is a deceitful attempt to make you forget about US interventions in Yemen, Libya and Syria that were more brutal. Don’t buy their propaganda.**

**Charles 22**, Hampton Institute, (Julien, “Resurrecting the Ghouls: On the West's History of Hating Russians and Rehabilitating Nazis”, <https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/tag/orientalism>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

TRIGGER WARNING: mention of r\*pe

We might argue that this is different: Russia invaded another country. **On investigation the argument falters**, fractures amid a sea of sharp facts: a **foreign backer**, a **coup d’etat**, an **ultranationalist takeover**, a **Nato infiltration**, a legal apparatus mobilized against its own citizens, a massacre of ethnic Russians, preparations for a final assault. And finally, a full response from Moscow.

But even if an invasion were our threshold for outrage, none of this pathos has been evident in **our response** to the U.S.-backed **Saudi war on Yemen**, or **U.S. wars** on **Libya and Syria**. Even though the western aggression is criminal and death tolls are staggering. Even though there were plenty of visuals and myths available to rouse the choler of the people: visions of rampaging soldiers on Viagra rape sprees; grotesquely thin and lifeless children in the dust of the KSA’s induced famine; the hurling of gays off rooftops in Raqqa by ‘moderate rebels’. No, our **collective consciousness** has definitely been conditioned to **despise** most of all the legatees of Soviet communism, punished for the sins of the father in the first instance and for the defense of their national autonomy in the second. **War**, and **war propaganda**, is often a kind of **industrialized hatred**, organized malice armed with the **implements of death**.

As Arthur Ponsonby says in his book Falsehoods in War Time, deceitfulness is extraordinarily useful because humanity is mendacious and credulous in near equal measure. It **lies** and **refuses to believe** it is being lied to. Ponsonby, a member of British Parliament writing after World War I, says that nations must “justify themselves by depicting the enemy as an undiluted criminal; and secondly, to inflame popular passion for the continuance of the struggle.” Obviously little has changed since our **initial experience** of industrial warfare. We are constitutionally and economically committed to **domineering aims**, are inimical to anything that might impede our expansion, and we **rationalize** our behavior to these ends with a healthy dose of projection abetted by **racist caricature**. It is a frightful concoction of pitiless greed and base prejudice.

Yet every time we think we have put these cruel rancorous sides to our human selves to rest, they reappear, refashioned in new apparel, with **fresh logic**, **ironclad rationales**. **We are sold a bill of goods**. Perhaps this should come as no real surprise to citizens of a country that worships a single skill, salesmanship, and a single “virtue”, wealth, as its most sacred values. **Everything is a commodity** and everything that has been sold in the past will be sold again. Our entertainment culture is rife with reproductions of yesterday’s stories. **Why not re-commoditize fascism?** Wave the colors of a new flag and herald the insignia of a new battalion. Lionize a new leader, dress him in army green and pose him on the marble stairs of the halls of power, sandbags stacked to the roofs behind him. **Honor under siege**.

What has been sold before will be sold again; what we have hated before we will hate again. If it isn’t quite eternal return then it surely is **history recurring as tragedy then farce**. This soft embrace of fascism and rabid anti-communism goes all the way back to the Bolshevik uprising. As one of Kepler’s Nordic tales is subtitled, “Sometimes the past won’t stay buried.” Yes, the graves are always rather too near the surface.

**Link---Balkans**

**Their Balkans securitization is an unsophisticated trope that simultaneously renders them an insignificant Other and a disease in need of NATO’s cure.**

**Bryan 18**, University of San Francisco, (Madelynn , “Geopolitics And The Balkan Other: The Uses Of “Balkanism” In NATO Expansion”, Undergraduate Honors Thesis, <https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=honors>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

By manipulating long-established negative representations and historical narratives, the VOA **“others”** Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia to create an urgent necessity for their accession to NATO. The uses of **balkanist discourses** for the purpose of NATO expansion have significant implications, both theoretically and practically. In terms of theories of the “other,” it presents an unusual case study of “othering.” Since “othering” involves emphasizing contrasts between groups, it is typically a mechanism of exclusion. However, in the balkanist discourses of VOA, the “othering” functions to compel inclusion in a particular group. This is not to suggest that the “othering” of these three countries is not for the purpose of invoking a contrast as described by Wolf (1994). The discourses maintained the depictions of **backwardness** and **volatility** of past discourses on the Balkans without remarkable variation. The negative representations then followed an expected dynamic of contrasting with and thus **defining** a **NATO of progressiveness**, **stability**, and **democracy**—a NATO that will **cure the disease of Balkan-ness** with its all-encompassing transformative influence.

Hence, the contrast encourages these countries to seek inclusion in NATO in two ways. By defining the more positive image of the West, it strives to increase the attractiveness of NATO accession. Moreover, the “**othering**” creates a false separation between the Balkans and Europe (e.g. the West). If countries within NATO and the EU are indubitably within Europe then there is no geographic basis for “othering” the Balkans in these terms. To the east, west, north, and south, NATO and EU members surround them. Thus, creating this distance between them and the EU coercively compels them to join NATO in order to be part of Europe and the West. The discourse “**others**” them in order to produce a **false need to legitimize their place** in Europe, inversing the usual exclusionary purpose of “othering.” This is not to imply that the geopolitical uses of balkanism are homogenous. For example, the EU may well “other” these countries in order to preserve their “outsider” status given that more is at stake economically and politically in integrating them than in the case of a military alliance. Since the geopolitical uses of balkanist discourse have proven malleable across time, it may differ depending on perspective as well. More research could increase our understanding of how and why balkanism continues to be a salient mechanism of geopolitics in different periods and contexts.

The current balkanist discourse has practical implications as well. As Hammond (2004) showed of early balkanist discourses, they have geopolitical uses with real political impacts. The specific purpose of balkanist discourses have changed but not the way they lend themselves to geopolitical power dynamics. Kovacevic claims that **Montenegro** “becomes a mere **pawn in the geopolitical chess game** by the **antagonistic colonial powers** which NATO must win at **any price**” (2017, 46). The same could be said of the three countries in this study **as the US embroils them** in their disputes with Russia and other countries. They claim to offer **protection** to the Balkans yet **do not prove** that their involvement in the region is any different than the countries of which the US warns them. They are more interested in **hindering the advances** of the other ‘malign foreign influences’ or rather, countries with which the US currently has disagreements, than helping the Balkans.

By supporting those politicians in Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia who most reflect western discourses, the US may alienate those in power from the people of the country. The difference in US discourse on the current Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev and his predecessor, as discussed earlier, revealed the difference in how the US discusses the politicians who reflect their agenda. Zaev most emphatically adhered to US discourse. The results are more than merely misguided perceptions of the Balkans. As domestic politicians receive more international legitimacy by adhering to these discriminatory discourses, they become partakers of the balkanist discourse, “othering” their own people. Just as the US does, the domestic **political elite manipulate representation** of their people to their own political ends. The US uses balkanist discourses to **control** them at the level of the nation while the domestic politicians serve an **image** of the Balkans to the West as it prefers to see them.

If the political elite seek NATO membership to strengthen ties with the US, it could be against the desires of the people. As the opinion polls showed in the case of Montenegro, attitudes on NATO accession tends to be far from homogenous in the former Yugoslav states (Citizen’s Attitudes on NATO Integrations, 2015). Its controversial reception in Montenegro is also a point of Kovacevic’s article (2017, 50). It is then possible the US and NATO use balkanist discourses to support regimes in the Balkans that derive their power from the approval of the West rather than the will of the people, negating its supposed aim of truly spreading democracy. This raises the further question of how elite political discourses differ from those of the general population. One cannot assume that because the political elite reflect western balkanist discourses, the population does as well. Differences in their discourse would better reveal the extent to which these uses of balkanism alienate the politicians from the people and whether the encouragement of NATO membership mispresents the general will.

Finally, my study begs the question of why such blatant balkanist discourse as that found in VOA survives so unchanged to the current day. Said’s seminal Orientalism has arguably ruptured the continuity of Orientalist representations. Of course, people may still employ Orientalist stereotypes, but his general ideas have entered mainstream thought. When employed, Orientalist representations are more likely to be in a nuanced form. No such rupture of balkanism is evident. As Goldsworthy notes, writers who would “consider themselves to be advanced exponents of European multicultural ideals” can write of people in the Balkans “with the sort of generalised [sic], open condescension which would appal [sic] them if applied to Somalis or the peoples of Zaire” (1998, xi). The easy continuance of balkanism is not from the lack of an academic exposé as the literature exemplifies. Goldsworthy’s comment suggests that, since the Balkans are within Europe, Europeans did not recognize their discourse on the Balkans as discriminatory.

Considering my earlier anecdote from the research program in Switzerland, I propose that the continuity of balkansim relates to the perception of the Balkans’ unimportance. While the VOA’s discourse **inflates** the **significance** of these countries’ need for NATO, it simultaneously **trivializes** the Balkans through representations of **unsophisticated tropes**. The domestic political elite then confirm this triviality rather than challenging it. The emphasis on the Balkans’ unimportance allows the discourses to remain unnoticed by the public eye. This is what leads generally well-informed people such as my colleagues in Geneva to dismiss a study of the Balkans. The **arrogant trivializing** of Balkan countries allows such discriminatory discourse to continue unchallenged among critical circles where it should receive censure.

**Link---Middle East**

**Their policy research of Middle East securitization propagates Western exceptionalism, built around racist assertions, violent regimes, outsourcing of torture, civilian targeting, and mass detentions. Don’t trust the West.**

**Cambanis and Antoun 22**, \*Thanassis Cambanis is an author, journalist, and director of Century International. His work focuses on U.S. foreign policy, Arab politics, and social movements in the Middle East. \*\*Naira Antoun is a fellow at Century International and director of the Transnational Trends in Citizenship initiative. She is also a contributing editor at Mada Masr, where she has worked since its establishment in 2013., (Thanassis and Naira, “No Region Is an Island: Crises and Their Solutions Connect the West and Middle East”, The Century Foundation, <https://tcf.org/content/report/no-region-is-an-island-crises-and-their-solutions-connect-the-west-and-middle-east/?agreed=1>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Despite the bountiful evidence of the fallacies of exceptionalism, **Western policymakers** and researchers have subjected the Middle East to a **particularly toxic** form of analysis, falsely attributing its problems to innate **cultural** or **political traits**. In reality, **Western interventions**, from the colonial era to the War on Terror, have shaped the region’s politics and often **drove its conflicts**. Edward Said’s Orientalism, published in 1978, remains one of the clearest articulations of this argument—that Western policy and ideas have **exceptionalized** the Middle East, throughout history, as if the region operates under different rules than human societies everywhere else in the world.5 Policymakers and analysts in the West built policy around these **unfounded**, often **racist assertions**, including **tropes** about Islam being incompatible with democracy, or about sectarian and ethnic violence being supposedly normal and routine. This **Western exceptionalizing** of the Middle East has driven **pernicious policies** by the United States and other Western governments, including **support for violent regimes** in the Middle East; renditions and **U.S. outsourcing of torture** to Middle Eastern partner governments; indiscriminate **targeting of civilians** in the War on Terror; **mass** and extrajudicial **detentions**; and the **diminution of rights** and due process for enemies labeled as terrorists.

**Policy**, **research**, and academic institutions **have made exceptionalism** an all but **permanent** feature of their output by putting regional experts and expertise into silos. Some of this regionalization is an unavoidable feature of organizing research departments or policymaking institutions, which systematically and structurally promote analysis and **knowledge production** around either geographic, disciplinary, or functional categories. As a result of these organizational and structural factors, even experts who consciously seek to overcome exceptionalism or regional silos can unwittingly fall into blinkered and institutionalized professional habits.

In this project, Maya Mikdashi describes, in her dialogue with Karma R. Chávez, a compelling example of how such exceptionalism is reproduced in academic research:

It is rare for a book in queer, gender, or feminist studies (or a “theoretical” book more generally), which is anchored in research in the United States, to be encumbered with a title that ends with the hanging phrase “in the United States.” Instead, the title is location-less, and in some cases, so is the writing itself, as if research conducted in the United States should speak for the world. The United States is treated as an exemplary place from which to derive or produce narratives (or theories) that are universal or universalizing in reach.6

By the logic of exceptionalism, the Middle East can only teach us about itself. It cannot contribute to theory, nor have relevance beyond its location.

The efforts in Transnational Trends in Citizenship build on those of an earlier Century International project, Citizenship and Its Discontents. Participants in this precursor project, which concluded in 2019, found considerable common ground in the quest for universal rights across borders and identity categories in the Middle East. Citizenship and Its Discontents sought ways to discuss the quest for meaningful citizenship and universal rights within the diversity of the Middle East.7 Transnational Trends in Citizenship extends the idea beyond the regional prism.

Analyst and humorist Karl Sharro, one of the participants in Citizenship and Its Discontents, began in 2016 to jokingly refer to himself as a “WENA expert” (Western Europe and North America), poking fun at the reductive nature of much analysis of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region.8 But Sharro’s joke contains a powerful insight, and a handy method to test regional generalizations for exceptionalism. Any analytical tool that serves MENA should do the same for WENA. By the same token, analysis that is reductive, bigoted, or essentialist doesn’t serve any case; a statement about WENA that is patently ridiculous will be equally silly for the MENA region. Comparison can help reveal poor methods in order to quickly discard them. For example, consider how quickly serious Western thinkers would dismiss, out of hand, an inquiry into whether Christianity is inherently violent or compatible with democracy, or whether “American culture” is mature enough to accept the compromises inherent to legislative democracy. If the question is untenable when applied to a familiar society, it should not be applied to another society, either.

Overcoming Exceptionalism

Acknowledging the harm that exceptionalism does to analysis and policy, and expunging it from the questions we ask and the writing we produce, are important steps toward overcoming it. But exceptionalism is deeply ingrained in inquiries about both the MENA region and Western Europe and North America. Going beyond area-based silos—and conquering exceptionalism—means creating **new methodologies** and new approaches to **knowledge production**. Transnational Trends in Citizenship attempts to advance such a methodology, by putting experts on the Middle East and the West and their parallel inquiries on equal footing.

**Link---Global Periphery**

**NATO as the policer of the global periphery reproduces civilizational assimilation and the Western epistemological apparatus as the “cure” to the world, striking down Leftist resistance and creating endless interventions in the name of global containment.**

**Abu Odeh 20**, Abu Odeh is an Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, a permanent fellow of the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, and an advisor for Visto International. He received his PhD from Indiana University of Pennsylvania in 2017, and where he also taught between the years 2014-2015. In 2009, he was a visiting scholar at University of California-San Diego where he conducted a critical study on the politics of knowledge and late style in the work of Edward Said. His research focuses on Orientalism, postcolonialism, critical theory, race studies, and the politics of exile. His latest book, The Consolations of Exile: Narrating the Self, has recently been published by the Arab Institute for Research and Publication, Beirut(2019). (Tayseer, “European Universalism’ and ‘Post-Orientalism”, Visto International, https://vistointernational.org/publications/european-universalism-and-post-orientalism/) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

**Imperialistic** and **ideological roots** lie at the heart of the pan-European universal rhetoric in that it **justifies** and **sustains** the United States’ policies as the **world’s superpower**. In a similar vein, such **rhetoric** justifies the actions of the **NATO alliance**, the U.K., and mainstream َWestern media as they intervene to dominate the scene in the Middle East, which Orientalists refer to as the “periphery countries”.

This situation seems **extremely dangerous** because the US, being the New Rome, is reproducing a **fixed binary rhetoric** that does not accept the **opposite other**: the struggle between good and evil; between those who follow European universal system, and those who oppose it. Therefore, Eurocentrism produces **fixed values of peace**, **war**, **free markets**, and the **new global order**. As for their part, universities have played a central role in promoting Western-centrism, both in **form** and **substance**.

The **Western rhetoric** meant here is one which takes root in Western universal values being adopted by all contemporary states, especially those considered as part of the periphery. In this sense, the periphery’s involvement in the European universal rhetoric becomes a form of **civilisational assimilation**, including the Reaganian **neoliberal policies** up until the current Trumpian era, which so far represents the darkest manifestation of radical European universalism, Islamophobia and anti-immigrantion. Other representative cases would be Boris Johnson’s leadership in the UK, in addition to all conservative European leaders, who view with suspicion and ‘identitarian’ Orientalism all immigrants from beyond the Mediterranean and elsewhere, especially those coming from the Middles East and Muslim countries.

In his article titled: “Imperialist political rhetoric”, the Arab thinker Joseph Massad (2020) argues that the United States has expanded its neoliberal efforts during the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), the 40th U.S. president, to **contain the entire globe**, and to change the **chief political ideas used by the International Left** against the United States’ global power. Massad reaffirms that these colonial ambitions have rested on an essential goal: to **reshape the international political culture**, not just inside but also outside of the U.S. borders. Drawing on Francis Fukuyama’s argument of the end of history, such a mission would be described as **“liberal democracy.”** In his provocative article “The End of History?”, Fukuyama argues that the historical class struggle between the ‘master and slave’ wouldn’t have realistically ended without Western democracies and the free market economy. The future, Fukuyama argues, is bound up with capitalism, in the face of which all other international systems stand defenseless. Here, I pose a rhetorical question: if Fukuyama were right, what has American democracy brought to the Middle East ‒ assuming that it is based on the principles of justice, equality and freedom as enshrined by the Founding Fathers ‒ in light of the **endless American intervention** policie**s**, the last of which is the Deal of the Century?

The **Western universal ideology** and **rhetoric of terror** go hand in hand as a **Western-centric narrative**, exhibited as a sort of an **epistemological**, **therapeutic**, and **civilisational apparatus**. It is derived from Jacques Derrida’s notion of “Pharmakon” (or the remedy) which ‒ according to this Western-centric rhetoric ‒ **cures** the backward periphery. However, we only find this Pharmakon to be ‒ as put by Mustafa Said, the protagonist in Tayeb Salih’s novel, “Season of Migration to the North” ‒ a “germ”. Said says as he sets the scene for such a historical and narrative trial: “They imported to us the germ of the greatest European violence, as seen on the Somme and at Verdun, the like of which the world has never previously known, the germ of a deadly disease that struck them more than a thousand years ago” (Salih, 1991, p. 95).

**Link---Liberalism**

**Promotion of Western liberalism constructs the understanding that subjectivities who don’t conform to liberalism must be corrected and rationalized before deserving trust and respect.**

**Gheciu 05**, Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance and the liberal order, the Global Right, state (re)building, and International Relations theory., (Alexandra, “NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War”, Stanford University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780804767668>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The emerging Western consensus around the importance of this **inside logic**, involving the pursuit of international security through the construction of particular types of institutions within the potentially problematic states of Central/Eastern Europe, found expression in the early 1990s in the key documents, conventions, and charters of European reconstruction. In a situation in which Western decision makers regarded the **liberal democratic values** of the transatlantic community as **universally valid**, the concept of promotion of “good” institutions of domestic governance came to be synonymous with the projection of liberal democracy into the former Communist countries of Europe. The **Western discourse** on international security articulated in the early 1990s depicted the triumph of liberal democracy (particularly against “flawed,” “dangerous” pro-Communist projects) as the **source of progress**, freedom, and stability in and among Euro-Atlantic states. By extension, it presented the projection of the same values in the former Eastern Bloc as a solution to the problems of ex-Communist states, and, at the same time, as a key to broader European security.

The Kantian ideas that found expression in the prevailing Western discourse at the end of the Cold War reflect a **particular understanding of human nature**. Kantian liberalism relies upon liberal selves as actors who are committed to the struggle to discipline the irrational, violent sides of themselves, and to govern their lives in accordance with the universal moral precepts **revealed by reason**. Self-discipline, from this liberal perspective, is the **basis of respect** and admiration of self and others, as well as a central element in the process of identity definition. From the point of view of liberal democratic polities, **only** those **self-disciplined communities** who live according to the same moral precepts—embodied in liberal democratic norms and institutions—**are entitled to full respect** and to be recognized as trustworthy, **like-minded polities**. As such, they are to be included in relations of community. 113 Key to this liberal definition of subjectivity is a refusal of essentialist determinism, by which, by virtue of their capacity for reason, all humans are seen as capable of grasping the moral law and hence of having the potential to **evolve** into the kinds of actors who understand and accept the self-disciplinary duties of **“correct” subjectivity**. 114 **Within i**nternational **r**elations, this view of subjectivity translates into the argument that even people of deviant **(anti-liberal)** polities can, through the use of reason, come to accept the responsibility of learning to conform to liberal democratic norms. In other words, all polities embody the **potential** to evolve into **“good,” rational**, and ethical **communities**, entitled to the full respect and benefits accorded to liberal democracies in international society. The view of a **changeable, fluid human nature** renders practices of socialization reasonable, for it entails the idea that even citizens of previously anti-liberal polities (e.g., ex-Communist states) can learn the norms and institutions of liberalism.

**Link---Terrorism**

**‘Terrorist’ discourse is an Orientalist, symbolic power that stigmatizes the Arab body as a means of constructing their hegemonic vision of a superior West.**

**Tuastad 03**, Dag Tuastad, who earned a PhD in Social Anthropology at the University of Oslo, is a researcher at PRIO, the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, and teaches Middle East Studies at the University of Oslo., (Dag, “Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(s)” *in Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 591-599 (9 pages), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993426>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

[Modified] for ~~gendered langauge~~

**Symbolic power** is power to construct a **hegemonic version of reality**.' The means of production in this sense is also the means to produce **distorted images of dominated people**. Hence, **resistance** also involves **resistance to the imaginaries** produced by the hegemonic power. Palestinians are victims of symbolic violence in two ways. The first is the **'terrorist' stigma**, with which the occupying power has labelled Palestinian resistance organisations, if not the whole Palestinian population. The second way is that described by Edward Said in **Orientalism**, the imaginary of the **'Arab mind'** by the Israeli writer Raphael Patai, or by Sainia Hamady's imaginary of the temperament and character of Arabs that Said quotes:

The Arabs ... have demonstrated an incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity.... They show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for common benefit or mutual profit is alien to them ... The Arab has little chance to develop his potentialities and define his position in society, holds little belief in progress and change, and finds salvation only in the hereafter.2

The production of such imaginaries dominated the writings of the early Israeli social science establishment, as has been documented by Elia Zureik.3 The focus was on the Palestinian as an individual actor, on [their] ~~his/her~~ **psychology**, **culture**, **value system**, temperament and so forth. Attachments to extended kinship systems, labelled 'familism', were interpreted as if Arabs were resistant to Western-style industrialisation and development, and by implication, to democratisation. Raphael Patai in The Arab Mind is a telling example of this approach.4 Patai leans on **psychological cultural explanations** when he describes the **stagnation** and **backwardness of Arabs**, claiming that 'the problem' is rooted in mental configurations, as the title of his book suggests.5 Arabs have a 'sense of marginality which never allows an Arab to detach [themself]~~himself~~ from [their]~~his~~ traditional culture', Patai writes-the Arab has a 'proclivity to blaming others for his own shortcomings and failure. Since the West is the most readily available scapegoat, it must take most of the blame, with that goes inevitably most of the hate.'6

Alroy, building on Patai, claims that Palestinian resistance against Israel is based on 'basic personality traits peculiar to Arab peoples', which refers to the notion that **'the Arabs are a fiercely vengeful people'**.7

This **imaginary of Arabs** has significant political implications. For example, Waschitz asserts that 'various social and communal groups' (the terms used when referring to Palestinians) lack the 'psychological readiness', the cultural qualities that are needed to be members of a democratic society.8 This is the **underlying message** of these interpretations of Arab social organisation: Arabs or Palestinians do not have the **'civic' ethos** necessary for political communities. The political implication is what Said has called the project of **'Orientalism'**: **'They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented'**. This is the quotation from Marx that is stated on the opening page of Orientalism.9

A measure of the powerfulness of states is their ability to **thwart attempts** to **unmask that power**.10 **'Terrorism'** and **'familism'** or **'Arab mind'** labels equally serve as **powerful inventions** that **legitimise continuous colonial** economic or political **projects.** The imaginaries of 'terrorism' and 'Arab mind' backwardness are closely connected. The latter explains the former as irrational-violence thus becomes the product of a backward culture. I will argue that this way of explaining the violence of peripheralised people in conflict is a form of symbolic violence, a form that has been characterised as the 'new barbarism thesis'.

The **new barbarism** thesis

What is meant by 'new barbarism'? Paul Richards has used the term to criticise presentations of political violence that omit political and economic interests and contexts when describing that violence, and present the violence as resulting from traits embedded in local cultures.'2 With the US President George **Bush's** description of a **'war on terrorism'** following the September 11 attacks as a 'crusade', and the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's statement on 26 September 2001 that 'We should be conscious of the **superiority of our civilization'**, the dubious success of this world view is indicated.'3

How is the new barbarism thesis produced? Zygmunt Bauman has argued that in modern societies **racist imaginaries need professional organisation**, leadership and experts.'4 These are provided by the **moral authority** that state apparatuses need to rest their claims on: **science**. Thus, **opinions that have a scientific validity**, but at the same time a language that allows them to reach broader audiences, as well as a language understandable to politicians, are very applicable. Who are the 'scientific' alibis for new barbarism? Richards has pointed out the US writer Robert Kaplan as a main proponent."5 I will deal in some length with a recent work by Kaplan, and then try to indicate how his thoughts resonate with neo-Orientalist sentiments in American academe.

**Link---IR---Double Logic**

**Their IR relies on a double logic, internally reshaping entities into “predictable” identities and externally constructing geopolitics in favor of Western dominance. That creates inevitable global inequalities and polices socioeconomic life into Western-accepted norms.**

**Gheciu 05**, Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance and the liberal order, the Global Right, state (re)building, and International Relations theory., (Alexandra, “NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War”, Stanford University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780804767668>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

The **double logic** of international security

In exploring the way in which both the **inside** and **outside** modes of pursuing international security are embodied in NATO, let us start with the international constitutive structure that enables these solutions. As constructivist International Relations theorists have argued, the **principle of sovereignty** plays a key constitutive role in the modern international system.14 As the **principle of differentiation** between the units populating the modern world, sovereignty conveys special connotations of **exclusiveness** and **possessiveness**.15

The emergence of sovereignty as the key principle of international organization meant that states—as the main politico-administrative units of the modern world—came to embody particular forms of **property** and **authority**.16 Most importantly, within clearly **demarcated territorial boundaries**, sovereigns acquired the right to issue and enforce definitions and rules regarding the proper organization of the political community.17 Those rules, which applied universally to individuals inhabiting the state, effectively drew the boundaries between normal and unacceptable principles of **political** and **socioeconomic** life.

As a consequence of the **triumph of sovereignty**, the modern period gave rise to the **promise of peace, order, and progress** within political communities where everyone was subject to sovereign rule. But the creation of pacified political communities simultaneously **re-created** the problem of **insecurity** at the level of the state system, since there was no overarching authority to enforce order among the sovereigns endowed with particular—sometimes competing—wills and interests. The problem revolved around the tension between the universal system (the world) and the particular entities (sovereign states) inhabiting it.

The principle of sovereignty entails two possible solutions to this problem, both of which are reflected in modern political thought and practice.18 There is an outside solution, which emphasizes **geostrategic arrangements** among sovereign units operating in an arena devoid of central authority. This solution is often presented—particularly in **neorealist theories of i**nternational **r**elations—as the **only possible way** of pursuing international security. In their view, given the tragic but inescapable verities of international relations, sovereigns have little freedom of choice in their interactions. The notion that underlies this solution is that anarchy is less intolerable at the level of states than it is at the level of individuals in a “state of nature.”19 At the international level, **freedom** combines with the **inevitable inequality** of states to give rise to such spatial arrangements as international **domination by powerful state(s)** and **balances of power**. The international system will, by necessity, be the arena where alliances form, break down, and re-form on the basis of new configurations of material power. Particular geostrategic arrangements come and go, but the dynamic governing their formation remains unchanged in a realm that lacks an overarching authority.20

But the principle of sovereignty, which constitutes particular units in a universal system, enables yet another mode of pursuing international security. It might be possible to achieve orderly and peaceful interaction among particular sovereign states if a way could be found to **(re)shape entities** in such a way that they would become **peaceful**, **predictable**, and **trustworthy** participants in international interactions. The tension between a universal system and entities endowed with particular wills would thus be resolved by having those particular states internalize a universally valid set of rules. This solution assumes that particular domestic structures—those that are built around **“good” values** and **institutions**— will generate stability and peace among states that possess such structures. Accordingly, it sets out to create conditions under which states would come to be **governed** by such **rational** and **ethical values and norms**.21

At the same time as it constitutes the possibility of pursuing the inside approach, the principle of sovereignty also has regulative effects on its implementation.22 Through its injunction regarding non-intervention by external actors in the domestic affairs of states, this principle was designed to protect the right of sovereigns to build “good” institutions of governance. In the theory of international relations, the inside mode of pursuing security and world order is particularly associated with the work of Immanuel Kant.23 The Kantian solution to international insecurity takes the form of a peaceful federation of states. But that federation can only be achieved via inside politics, for members of the pacific federation must become liberal republics.24

In modern international politics, state policymakers have used both modes of pursuing security. The inside approach, while sometimes forgotten by theorists of international relations, has played an important role by providing decision makers with an additional option on the menu of possible ways of pursuing security. This approach, involving the construction and protection of domestic institutions regarded as progressive and peace generating, found expression in the activities of NATO throughout its history. But the inside, Kantian-inspired mode of pursuing security has acquired unprecedented importance to the organization in the particular context of the post–Cold War world.

In establishing, enlarging, and transforming NATO, Western decision makers were enacting a particular **conception of** the **identity** of their community and the historically specific nature of threats to that community. In that context, the politics of inside—aimed at the protection and promotion of a community of liberal democratic values—was always an important dimension of NATO, and placed limitations on the geostrategic policies acceptable to the alliance. As the next chapter shows, historical records of the Cold War period refute potential claims that the inside dimension only mattered when NATO did not have any serious outside concerns.

**Techno-Orientalism---Topic Link**

**NATO is not constructed by geopolitical borders, but by the collective identity of the West that seeks "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples." The basis of security cooperation disfavors aiding the “inferior” East, dividing the world into a racial hierarchy with Asiatics at the bottom.**

**Hemmer and Katzenstein 02**, \* Christopher Hemmer is the Dean and a Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College. \*\*Professor Katzenstein is the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr Professor of International Studies. His research and teaching lie at the intersection of the fields of international relations and comparative politics. Katzenstein's work addresses issues of political economy, and security and culture in world politics., (Christopher and Peter J., “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism” in *International Organization* 56, 3, pp. 575-607) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

A border, argued Georg Simmel, is not a **geographic fact** that has sociological consequences, but a **sociological fact** that takes geographic form.54 The same can be said of regions. Neither the North Atlantic nor Southeast Asia existed as geographical facts. Both were **politically constructed**.55

The policy of the United States regarding the organization of both regions is puzzling. From a realist perspective, the U.S. preference for multilateralism in Europe after World War II is quite surprising. As Steve Weber notes, a hegemon can maximize its bargaining leverage by forging a series of bilateral deals with its allies rather than tying its hands in a multilateral framework.56 Conversely, liberals would probably find the U.S. preference for bilateralism in Southeast Asia after World War II the greater puzzle. As Anne-Marie Burley notes, multilateralism is "the form to be expected from a set of international regimes established by a liberal state."57 A satisfactory explanation must account for both U.S. choices.

The effects of **collective identity** are an important ingredient to any such explanation. The institutional forms the United States favored in Europe and Asia during the early Cold War were shaped by the different levels of identification that U.S. policymakers had with these newly constructed regions. **Identification**, as Martha Finnemore notes, "**emphasizes the affective relationships between actors**" and "is an ordinal concept, allowing for degrees of affect as well as changes in the focus of affect."58 An argument about the importance of identification in driving U.S. policy in these two regions is consistent with what is perhaps the dominant psychological theory about group identity and its effects—**social identity theory**.59 Once people identify themselves as part of a particular group, studies of social identity have found, they treat members of that group very differently than those outside the group. For instance, when people distribute gains within a defined group, they tend to look more toward maximizing absolute gains; in dealing with outsiders they tend to focus more on **relative gains** and **maximizing the differential** between insiders and outsiders.60 These findings have been consistent across studies even with the flimsiest and most arbitrarily defined groups. In short, identification is the **mechanism** that helps connect the construction of specific regional groupings in Europe and Asia to particular **institutional features**—multilateral or bilateral—**of** particular **military alliances**.

Looked at from the perspective of social identity theory, U.S. policies in both regions become less puzzling. Once the North Atlantic was constructed as a region that put the United States in a grouping of roughly equal states with whom it identified, multilateral organizing principles followed closely. As Ernest Bevin, the British foreign minister put it, bilateral relations imposed by the strongest power, similar to what the Soviets were doing in Eastern Europe, are "not in keeping with the spirit of Western civilisation, and if we are to have an organism in the West it must be a spiritual union .. . it must contain all the elements of freedom for which we all stand."61 U.S. policymakers agreed, believing that the Europeans could be trusted with the additional power a multilateral institution would give them and that the Europeans deserved this increased influence.

Lacking strong identification, the United States did not, however, apply the same liberal principles when it came to organizing the newly created Southeast Asian region. Once **Southeast Asia**, in the view of U.S. policymakers, was constructed as a region composed of **alien and**, in many ways, **inferior actors**, bilateralism followed closely. U.S. policymakers did not believe that the Southeast Asian states could be **trusted** with the increased influence a multilateral institution would offer, nor was there any sense that these states deserved such a multilateral structure.

What was the basis for the identification of the United States with Europe and the lack thereof in its relations with Asia? The available evidence is relatively sketchy and permits only cautious inferences. In their identification with Europe, U.S. officials typically refer to religion and democratic values as the bedrock of a North Atlantic community. A common race is mentioned, though less often, perhaps because Germany's genocidal policies in the 1940s had thoroughly delegitimated that concept in European political discourse.62 Perceived affinities of various types reinforced the political trust rooted in common democratic political institutions, "we-feeling," and "mutual responsiveness" that Karl Deutsch and his associates have described as central ingredients of the emergence of a North Atlantic security community, defined by the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change.63 In the case of **Asia**, these various affinities and trust were absent, religion and democratic values were shared only in a few cases, and **race was invoked as a powerful force** separating the United States from Asia. The U.S. preference for multilateral or bilateral security arrangements followed from these different constellations.

The Origin of the North Atlantic Community. The creation of the political concept of the **North Atlantic community** is an excellent example of the process of identification at work in U.S. politics as well as a demonstration of how **issues of identity** are **entwined** with material factors and **instrumental political calculations**. The emergence of a North Atlantic region followed a dramatic change in the prevalent image of the United States' place in the world that occurred during World War II. Before the war, Alan Henrikson argues, maps were typically drawn with the United States in the center surrounded by two oceans. However, the efforts to resupply Great Britain and to later transport large numbers of troops to Europe caused a change in that cartographic and cognitive image. During and after the war, more and more maps appeared that put the Atlantic in the center with the United States and Europe positioned on opposite sides. During World War II, the Atlantic association thus became more natural.64 The shift to a "North" Atlantic focus was given a boost after 1945 when the Soviet Union pressured Norway to sign a defense pact. Had the Soviet Union established a zone of influence over Norway it would have gained a large window on the Atlantic and thus exposed Europe's northern flank.65

The creation of the new geographic category of "North Atlantic" also served clear political ends and was in some ways the product of calculated political agency. Martin Folly, for example, argues that "the idea of a North Atlantic system was a stroke of genius" on the part of Ernest Bevin.66 In the early 1940s, the British government embarked on a political strategy aiming to prevent a disengagement of the United States from Europe after the end of the war. Bevin recognized that the United States would hesitate to join a "European" alliance, but would feel much more comfortable talking about sea-lanes, access to bases, and a "North Atlantic" alliance. A North Atlantic focus meshed nicely with the U.S. military's concern with "stepping stones" across the Atlantic. Reliant on bases and stopping-off points for the transportation of troops and equipment across the Atlantic, the armed services' emphasis on the importance of Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores also put the Atlantic in the foreground.67 In U.S. domestic politics, the focus on a North Atlantic community had a two-fold advantage. It promised to be an easier sell to an electorate and a Congress wary of European entanglements;68 furthermore, the concept of **'community'** established a **basis for identification** that transcended military-strategic considerations.

Terminological innovation also suited Canada. Seeking to minimize bilateral dealings with the United States, Canada opposed any sort of "dumbbell" shaped arrangement combining a North American and a European pole. A North Atlantic arrangement would allow Canada to use the European states as a balance against the United States. It would also allow the Canadian government to portray its concessions to the alliance as concessions to a North Atlantic group of states and not solely as concessions to the United States. In short, a North Atlantic community meant that Canada did not have to deal with the United States alone.69

It is important to note that this geographically defined category constrained, but did not determine membership. If geography is destiny, the inclusion of Italy, "unwashed by Atlantic waters," in NATO was clearly an anomaly.70 So was the subsequent accession of Greece and Turkey. Even after George Kennan acquiesced in the creation of a North Atlantic treaty, he continued to oppose Italy's participation. Only by limiting the treaty to a strict geographic area, Kennan reasoned, could the United States avoid provoking the Soviet Union and offending other allies by their exclusion. As Kennan saw it, "the only sound standard for membership in the Atlantic Pact was indeed a geographic one."71 While the administration readily conceded that Italy was not in the North Atlantic, it continued to support Italy's inclusion because it was too important to Atlantic defenses to be left out.72 Italy's inclusion among NATO's founding members, along with that of undemocratic Portugal (given the strategic importance of the Azores), underscore the importance of eclectic explanations that encompass both strategic calculations and regional identities. In these two cases, the geographically defined region and the sense of identification with fellow democracies proved less decisive than strategic calculations in determining membership. Italy's membership ended up being consequential, however, because even as it violated "the 'natural' geographic basis of the North Atlantic, it had the subtle effect of extending the Atlantic concept itself to eventually include both the Western and the Eastern Mediterranean.73

In 1948, official and public discourse regarding Europe saw a major and sudden change. Before March 1948, a possible transatlantic alliance was invariably discussed under the rubric of a European or a Western European alliance. After March 1948, however, the focus of official discourse, as reflected in the documents produced at the time, shifted radically to an Atlantic or North Atlantic treaty system and community. The public discourse, as indicated by the coverage of the New York Times, underwent a similar transformation in late 1948. For example, in the editorial cartoons offered in the "Week in Review" section, the graphical opponent of the Soviet Union changes from Europe, to Western Europe, to the West, and finally, by December 1948, **to** the North Atlantic and **NATO**. The relatively sudden emergence of this "North Atlantic" focus demonstrates that new regional identities can emerge quickly if suitable material and ideational raw materials are available.

Considering the rapidity of this shift to a North Atlantic focus, it is noteworthy that U.S. State Department officials insisted that the signatories of the treaty did not invent the North Atlantic region. They maintained instead that the treaty merely codified a political community that had been in existence for centuries and that provided the basis for mutual identification. In the words of Dean Acheson, NATO was "the product of at least three hundred and fifty years of history, perhaps more."74 Yet, for all the stress on the reality and long history of the region, prior to 1948, with the exception of a few references to the International Civil Aviation Organization, State Department officials never talked about a North Atlantic region. Like geography, history was not destiny.

The Origins of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia as a particularly defined region has also had a relatively brief history. Before World War II, the region had been known by a number of different names. Some divided the area into Chineseinfluenced Indochina, the Spanish-influenced Philippines, and those areas strongly influenced by Indian culture. Among European and U.S. diplomats, the region was often seen as an extension of either China or India and referred to as "further India," "greater India," "Indo-China," or "the Far Eastern tropics." The popular term in Japan was "Nan-yo" (southern seas) and in China either Nan-Yang or Kun-Lun ("Little China" or "the lands of the Southern Ocean").75

The rise to prominence of the term "Southeast Asia" came with Japan's occupation of the area during the Pacific War. The term emerged to designate the areas south of China that fell to Japanese occupation.76 The private correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill during World War II reflects the gradual emergence of this regional designation. A first mention came in early 1941 when Roosevelt wrote about Japan's proposal to forgo any armed advance into the "Southeastern Asiatic" area, provided the United States made a similar pledge. Roosevelt further explained to Churchill that the U.S. response was to simply warn Japan against taking any military moves in "South-East Asia."77

After the United States entered the war and decided to concentrate first on the European theater, discussion of the region faded. When attention shifted back to the Asian theater, what to call this region remained undecided. Churchill wrote in June 1943 that it was time for the Allies to think more about "the South East Asia (or Japan) front," and he recommended the creation of a new command for that region. Later, Churchill reiterated this call, but now denoted the envisioned entity as "a new command for East Asia." Here, practical political calculations heavily influenced the naming process as Roosevelt rejected Churchill's call for a unified East Asian command, arguing that creating such a command would alienate Chiang Kai-shek, who controlled the China theater. To avoid such an offense, Roosevelt moved the focus back to "South-East Asia." Churchill accepted Roosevelt's worries about offending China and agreed that "perhaps it would be desirable to give the new command the title of 'South-East Asia' instead of 'East Asia'."78 At the Quebec conference in August 1943, the United States and Great Britain agreed to create a Southeast Asian Command (SEAC). SEAC's area of responsibility corresponded roughly to what today is conventionally called Southeast Asia.

After the victory of communist forces in China, the hands-off policy the United States had adopted after the Pacific War shifted quickly. In Andrew Rotter's words, the Truman administration " 'discovered' Southeast Asia at the intersection of its policy toward China, Japan, Great Britain, and France."79 Bolstering pro-Western forces in the region could help contain China, restore Japan's economy, strengthen Britain, and halt the bleeding of France. U.S. policy became "regionalized." "American policy makers," writes Rotter, "no longer regarded Southeast Asia as a disparate jumble of unrelated states, but as a region that had to be tied to the most important independent nations of the Far East and Western Europe."80 SEATO, established in September of 1954, should be seen as an extension of this regionalization and the political attempt at tying the region to the rest of the world. Only two of SEATO's members, Thailand and the Philippines, were geographically part of Southeast Asia. The other six members (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United States) came from outside the region.

The inclusion of France and Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, Australia and New Zealand in SEATO raises a number of interesting issues. In one sense, it shows the importance of a sense of identity in forming alliances. As the United States endeavored to construct alliances outside of Europe, it sought the cooperation of European states even as European colonialism was collapsing in Asia. With Great Britain and France in the alliance, however, why not work multilaterally with them as the United States did with NATO? The answer to this question points to the malleability of identity—a source of weakness for explanations that focus only on identity. Looking to the post-war world, Franklin Roosevelt initially had hoped to work with China rather than European colonial powers, in bringing stability to Asia. When the victory of communist forces in China made that course impossible, the United States turned reluctantly to the European colonial powers as a distinctly second-best solution. Here is one area where the U.S. identification with its European allies broke down. The U.S. government was unwilling to identify itself too closely with the colonial practices of the European states in Asia; this limited the degree to which the United States wanted to work multilaterally with the European states in Asia. The pliability of this sense of identity—America is like the Europeans in Europe, but not like the Europeans in Asia—shows the limitations of explanations that focus only on collective identity and underlines the advantages of eclectic explanations.

NATO and SEATO. Based on civilizational, ethnic, racial, and religious ties as well as shared historical memories, identification with Europeans rather than with the peoples of Southeast Asia was considered to be quite natural. These different levels of mutual identification are an important cause of the different institutional forms that the United States favored for its alliances in Europe and Asia during the early Cold War.

One of the most striking aspects of the discussions surrounding the formation of NATO is the **pervasive identification of the United States with Europe**. This aspect is exemplified by the strident assertion that the North Atlantic already existed as a political community and that the treaty merely formalized this pre-existing community of shared ideals and interest.81 In political debates in the United States, one found constant references to a "**common civilization,"** a "community," a **shared "spirit," "like-minded peoples," and "common ideals."**82 As W. Averell Harriman put it, "there is a **spiritual emotion** about this which is hard to emphasize . . . free men are standing shoulder to shoulder."83 Even while criticizing the Truman administration's overall policies, the columnist Walter Lippman argued that the members of the "Atlantic Community" are "natural allies of the United States." The "nucleus" of this community, according to Lippman, is "distinct and unmistakable" based on geography, religion, and history.84 The rhetoric of the United States' European allies similarly referred to a "spiritual confederation of the West," protecting "Western bastion[s]," "the virtues and values of our own civilization," and how the "North Atlantic Community is a real commonwealth of nations which share the same democratic and cultural traditions."85 This sentiment found ultimate expression in the **preamble of the NATO treaty**, **which affirmed** the **determination** of the members "**to safeguard the** freedom, **common heritage and civilization of their peoples**."

Identification had an **undeniable racial component**. For example, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton hoped that NATO could be the first step in the formation of an Atlantic Federal Union. In his testimony in support of NATO, Clayton explicitly linked his support of closer U.S. and European relations to racial grounds in addition to cultural ones. He argued that "my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom and that are composed of the **white race**."86

In part because Americans identified strongly with Europeans, Europe was also judged to be a strong ally. Indeed, strong identification with Europe led the United States to consistently give very high and favorable estimates of the strength of its European allies.87 Throughout the Cold War, U.S. officials distinguished their NATO partners from other alliance members. Europe was seen as a "**center of world power**" populated by a "vigorous" people who had been powerful in the past and would be again in the future.88 Looking at what he called the "**great industrial complex of Western Europe**," President Eisenhower believed that America's Atlantic allies could not long remain intimidated by "190 million backward" Russians. Speaking specifically about the Eisenhower administration's plan to create a multilateral nuclear sharing arrangement within NATO, Dulles argued that a unilateral U.S. nuclear guarantee could not be "a sound basis for a major country's security" and that he simply could not "contemplate a situation in which there were first and second class powers in NATO."89

The United States' reaction to the formation of SEATO was very different. U.S. debates show hardly a trace of identification, and there are no equivalent statements of shared ideals or future visions of the Asian allies as great powers. Indeed, **it is the differences**, not the commonalties, **in civilization, race, ethnicity, religion, and historical memories** that lead to the articulation of strong doubts about the current and future strength of these nations as parts of an Asian alliance. Even as colonialism was ending, **the colonial mindset remained strong**. This outlook stemmed in large part from the personal backgrounds of the men who dominated the U.S. foreign policy machinery after World War II. Drawn from elite New England prep schools, Ivy League universities, and Wall Street businesses and law firms, the so-called "Eastern Establishment" was then in its heyday. These men, alternating between their private and public sector careers, switching positions "like lines in a hockey game changing on the fly," ventured into the post-World War II world with a European and even an Atlantic bias.90 Having "grown up and succeeded in a world marked by European power, Third World weakness, and nearly ubiquitous racial segregation," they could accept such distinctions between Europeans and others without question.91 Interestingly, when these men attempted to explain what they saw as the more alien and difficult to understand behavior of the Soviet Union, they invariably stressed the **"Asiatic" or "Oriental"** nature of the regime.92 As Senator James Eastland viewed the nascent Cold War, it was **a struggle between "eastern and western civilization,"** a battle **between** **"**the **Oriental hordes and a western civilization** 2,000 years old.**"**93

A multilateral approach in Europe also allowed American politicians to evade the potentially delicate challenge posed by different ethnic voting blocs in the United States. With large numbers of Americans tracing their ancestry to different European countries, attempting to play favorites or to make distinctions among these states in American foreign policy would be a risky strategy for elected politicians if these distinctions upset significant ethnic voting blocs. By treating all European allies the same, multilateralism offered a solution to what could otherwise have been a tricky balancing act. Since Asian-American voting blocs were less important during the early stages of the Cold War, a similar electoral dilemma did not arise with regard to U.S. foreign policy in Asia.94

There were, of course, segments in U.S. society that had more interactions with and material interests in Asia than Europe. Represented mostly by the midwestern and Pacific wings of the Republican party, these individuals called for an "Asiafirst" strategy after Pearl Harbor and continued to criticize U.S. foreign policy into the Cold War for paying too little attention to Asia. Part of the attention they gave to Asia was driven by their desire to criticize the European-focused Eastern Establishment that dominated the Democratic Party, the presidency, and the foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. government. A large part of this attention, however, was also driven by the commercial links Western businesses had forged across the Pacific and the large number of American missionaries who had gone to Asia.95

Why did the preferences of American elites looking to Europe prevail over those of the Asia-firsters? In keeping with our emphasis on the need for eclectic explanations, we find that the answer lies in a combination of identity and material factors. Identifying with Europe, the Eastern Establishment not only had a preference for cooperating with and focusing on Europe, it also controlled the institutional means of power within the United States to implement such a foreign policy. The European-firsters had political clout as "the foreign policy center was owned by the Establishment... largely from the northeastern part of the United States."96 And the United States had "a tradition of selecting foreign service officers from the Ivy League, and secretaries of state and treasury from Wall Street."97 In addition, a large number of the foreign service officers that did specialize in Asian affairs were purged from the government as a result of the McCarthy Red Scare following the fall of China.

Although represented by powerful figures on the American political scene, like Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and publishing magnate Henry Luce, himself the son of Asian missionaries, Asia-firsters were never as influential as their Eastern Establishment rivals.98 Furthermore, the opposition Republicans were split on the issue of a European versus an Asian focus, with the northeastern wing of the party solidly in the European-first camp and the midwestern wing of the party torn on the issue. Indicative of this split is the well-noted conversion of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan to support of Truman's foreign policy, especially NATO. This conversion was, in part, a result of an administration strategy, as Paul Nitze put it, "to build up Senator Vandenberg, as opposed to Senator Taft, and create a split within the Republican Party, and to drive our policy in between these two poles."99

This strategy was favored, no doubt, by the growing international interests and the political influence of the auto industry centered in Detroit.100 Eisenhower's victory over Taft in the Republican presidential primaries in 1952 indicated and solidified the triumph of the internationalist (and Europeanist) wing of the Republican party.

In explaining why one set of ideas triumphs over another, many analysts have pointed to the importance of the "fit" between any particular idea and the general ideological context, existing political institutions, and pressing political concerns. As Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes note, however, fit does not simply exist; instead it is made by political actors.101 Indeed, the stridency with which proponents of NATO stressed a pre-existing community and common civilization can be seen as part of a deliberate construction of "fit," drawing on both identity and material factors. A European strategy proved an easier sell to a nation that saw itself as an offshoot of Europe and whose levers of power were in the hands of men who identified closely with Europeans. In addition, strong economic links between the United States and Europe provided ample material incentives.

Although the European- and Asia-firsters disagreed over which region more deserved American attention and resources, it is important to stress that this disagreement did not involve a debate over multilateral or bilateral forms of international cooperation that the United States should adopt in these regions. This is most clear when one examines how Asia-firsters thought about their preferred policy in Asia. Their commitment to Asia did not extend to a willingness to pursue a multilateral path in that region. Their interactions with Asians, especially as part of Christian missionary work, did not lead to the development of a sense of identity with Asian peoples that could serve as a basis for a multilateral institution. The exact opposite occurred. Part of what made dealing with Asians rather than Europeans attractive to Asia-firsters was the sense that **backward Asians could still be saved under American tutelage**.102 Asians were viewed as **"barbarian but obedient,"** and Asia was thought of as "a region of vast resources and opportunities, populated by dutiful and cringing peoples who followed white leadership." **The goal was not multilateral cooperation among equals** (or even semi-equals), **but one of unilateral U.S. dominance**.103 The case of the Asia-firsters demonstrates the indeterminacy of arguments linking perceived interests and threats to particular institutional forms without consideration of collective identity. Even those Americans who saw U.S. interests more tied to Asia than to Europe, and who believed that the Cold War would be fought and won in Asia, did not reach for a multilateral framework for cooperation in this region. The belief that Asians were not only foreign, but also inferior, helped push these individuals to support unilateral or bilateral, rather than multilateral, policies in Asia.

When issues of identification, trust, and power arose with regard to SEATO, they did so in the context of explaining why **Asian allies could not have, and did not deserve, the same privileges** that had been given to the European allies. After signing a bilateral treaty with Japan, John Foster Dulles explained that, in the absence of identification, there could be no Asian equivalent of NATO. At the same time, however, he included Japan and the Philippines on the list of nations with which the United States shared a common destiny.104 This indicates both the diversity of sources and the varying strengths of U.S. post-World War II identifications. Even though Japan and the Philippines were situated outside of what Dulles saw as a Western "community of race, religion and political institutions," shared historical experiences (the war and subsequent occupation of Japan and the colonization of the Philippines) could provide some basis for identification with particular Asian states. Identification is a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing proposition. If race, religion, and shared political institutions helped to put the United States' European allies in a class ahead of its Asian allies, shared historical experiences similarly helped put certain Asian allies ahead of others.

There is a strong note of condescension in many of the U.S. discussions of SEATO; this condescension did not exist with regard to NATO. Many **American policymakers** did not see Asians as ready or sufficiently sophisticated to enjoy the trust and the same degree of power that the United States had offered to European states. In one particularly vulgar example, in the context of possible economic aid to the Philippines, one U.S. State Department official explained that the United States had to closely supervise the use of such aid, because as he saw it, they "were only one generation out of the tree tops."105

The **denigration of the importance of Asia** and the skill of Asians reached the highest levels in the U.S. State Department. While Dean Acheson was secretary of state he visited Europe at least eleven times, claiming at the same time to be too busy to make even a single visit to East Asia. With the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in June 1950, Acheson decided to actively support U.S. involvement in the war primarily to demonstrate American credibility to its new European allies. With regard to the later **war in Vietnam**, Walt Rostow attributed Acheson's eventual opposition to American involvement to the former secretary of state's calculation that it was "too much blood to spill for those little people just out of the trees."106 Later in his career, while reflecting on his overall approach to Asians, Acheson maintained that "I still cling to Bret Harte's aphorism, 'that for ways that are dark/And for tricks that are vain/**The Heathen Chinese is peculiar**.' But no more so than the heathen Japanese."107 Acheson was hardly alone. An even blunter example of America's condescension toward its potential allies in Asia can be found in a State Department memo discussing the possibility of forming a general Pacific Pact:

The plain fact is that any exclusive **Western joint action in Asia must carry with it the clear implication that we do not take the Asians very seriously and in fact regard them as inferiors. We shall not be able to avoid this implication because that is indeed our attitude**.108

The difference in identification and the different U.S. policies followed in Asia and Europe after World War II were not an aberration. In many ways, they were a continuation of U.S. wartime attitudes that led to a "Europe first" strategy; the **internment of Japanese-Americans**; a greater degree of **hatred regarding America's Asian enemies** (the Japanese) as opposed to European opponents (usually the Nazis rather than the Germans); and the basic decision, even before the war in Europe was over, to use the **atomic bomb against Japan** first, not Germany.109 Indeed, as Michael Hunt has argued, there is a long tradition in **U.S. foreign policy** of **dividing the world into a racial hierarchy**, with the United States and Great Britain at the top, followed by other European peoples, and **with Asians**, Latinos, and Africans further **down the list**.110 While overtly racial categories became less prominent over time and have been replaced in U.S. rhetoric, in recent decades, with allusions to cultural and civilizational values, the basic hierarchy has remained the same. The men in charge of handling the United States' post-World War II foreign policy were no exceptions. Franklin Roosevelt likened "the brown people of the East" to "minor children . . . who need trustees." Similarly, Harry Truman's private writings often lavished great praise upon the British, while speaking dismissively of "Chinamen" and "Japs." President Eisenhower placed "the English-speaking peoples of the world" above all others. As one of his advisers put it, "the Western world has somewhat more experience with the operations of war, peace, and parliamentary procedure than the swirling mess of **emotionally super-charged** Africans and **Asiatics** and Arabs that outnumber us."1 ''

**FW---Role-Playing/Debate as a Game**

**Role-playing NATO within the “rules of the game” reproduces the sovereign ontology of separation between acceptable or unacceptable, self or Other---that upholds the monopoly of symbolic violence in both learning and statecraft.**

**Gheciu 05**, Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance and the liberal order, the Global Right, state (re)building, and International Relations theory., (Alexandra, “NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War”, Stanford University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780804767668>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

By virtue of its involvement in the eastern projection of these norms, NATO is a particularly interesting case for a study on international socialization. Thus, what is involved here is the **role** played by an international institution **in drawing the boundary** between **acceptable** and **unacceptable modes of behavior**, and establishing legal and institutional arrangements that protect and reinforce that **symbolic boundary** in an area (security) conventionally regarded as key to the survival and freedom of the state, and, hence, as the exclusive domain of sovereign authorities.

As noted above, **modern sovereignty** works by affirming an **ontology of separation**, of inclusion and exclusion (inside and outside) that enables a capacity to draw the boundary between the normal and the exceptional, the acceptable and the unacceptable in the life of the polity. In the modern era, a **key power** of the state is the power to make a **certain interpretation of reality count**. Thus, a key role in the production of **domestic order** is played by the **reification of meaning** through the state’s capacity to issue interpretations of reality that are recognized as **legitimate** by its citizens. The power to reify meaning involves not only the capacity to define what is acceptable and unacceptable, but also to implement that definition by embedding it in a **series of laws** and **institutions** and by **socializing citizens to take those categories for granted**—in other words, by constructing the common sense of citizens. In that sense, by virtue of its ability to make certain interpretations of reality count, the modern state can be said to be the holder of a **monopoly of symbolic violence**.30

The modern state produces official classifications of reality; it **produces** and **institutionalizes** an **“official point of view”** which performs several key functions in society. To begin with, the official discourse performs a diagnostic, “an act of knowledge that begets recognition,” and that assigns **particular identities** to individuals and defines the key characteristics of different objects. Second, at the administrative level, the official discourse works via rules and prescriptions that instruct people what to do given who they are. Finally, the official discourse also interprets and records what people have actually done (e.g., via police records).31 These classifications of reality are embedded in institutions and **reproduced through** the **practices of individuals** that have been socialized into a particular set of dispositions for thinking and acting (habitus) **within the boundaries of the “official point of view”** in different fields of society. In the long term, habitus, which is cultivated in individuals through **systematic pedagogic practices**, contributes to the **reproduction of a specific social order** through processes of **self-censorship** and **self-limitation** on the part of individuals. Thus, the system of meanings and dispositions associated with a particular habitus becomes part of the **taken-for-granted “rules of the game”** by which everyone else in a given social context acts. A group habitus has the effect of producing among those who share it a “common-sense world, whose immediate self-evidence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world.”32 In the context of liberal democratic societies, habitus is especially important for maintaining and reproducing social order, for the norms of democracy and extensive individual freedoms require the formation of self-disciplined individuals able and willing to exercise those freedoms in a “responsible” way which does not undermine the key institutions of their society. As Mitchell Dean has explained, “Liberalism is as much concerned with the appropriate normalizing practices to shape the exercise of the citizens’ political freedom as it is with guaranteeing their rights and liberties.”33

In most of the Central and Eastern European countries, the **revolutions of 1989** brought about a breakdown of old structures of authority and de-legitimized the Communist “official point of view” and the institutions in which that point of view was embedded. In turn, this led to **debates** and political struggles **over the redefinition of reality**, as various groups sought to make different interpretations of reality count. As we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, while it might be tempting to think that the Central and Eastern Europeans simply adopted Western norms and rules and built a new official discourse around those norms, the situation was more ambiguous, not least because in the post–Cold War era there persisted numerous—and fairly strong—groups, in particular, Communists and nationalists, who refused to identify with the values and institutions of the West and put forward different interpretations of the identity of their countries. On that basis, they proposed **different symbolic boundaries** between the normal and the exceptional, the acceptable and unacceptable ways of governing their polity, gave different diagnostics of the problems, priorities, aims, and strategies of post-Communist reconstruction, and provided different interpretations of the “normal” relationships of their countries with the outside world. Moreover, even the groups and parties that advocated the construction of liberal democratic polities often defined liberal democracy in ways that were seen as **incorrect** and **unacceptable by** the **NATO** allies.

In that context of fluidity, NATO became involved in re-constituting Central and Eastern European polities through its efforts of promoting a liberal democratic set of classifications of reality, involving a particular, **Western-defined boundary** between acceptable and unacceptable modes of thinking and acting, elevating those classifications to the status of the “official point of view” and building new legal and institutional arrangements aimed at protecting and reproducing it. This systematic involvement in the (re)construction of Central and East European polities was facilitated by the fact that many pro-liberal elites in the former Communist bloc recognized NATO as a key institution of the Western community with which they identified, and, as such, as an authoritative, trustworthy source of expertise in the area of security. NATO carried out systematic practices of socialization of Central and Eastern European elites and societal actors into a particular set of norms associated with the liberal democratic identity, guiding them in the process of institutionalizing those norms, and helping them gain precedence over alternative (nationalist and communist) norms put forward by different domestic groups. In essence, NATO has played an important role in crafting liberal democratic polities in the former Eastern Bloc of Europe.

There were several types of socialization practices—teaching, **persuasion**, and **role-playing**—that **play**ed **important roles** in the process of international state-crafting carried out by NATO. Although it is useful to treat these as analytically distinct categories, it is also important to pay attention to the ways in which they often overlap in practice. Chapter 3 explains the meaning and dynamics of those types of socialization practices, and Chapters 4 and 5 examine their actual application and effects in post–Cold War interactions between NATO and Central and Eastern Europeans. As we shall see, in many cases—though not always—those practices of socialization did affect definitions of state identity and interests held by Central and Eastern European socializees.

In this book, state identities refer to prevailing national ideas of collective distinctiveness and purpose.34 These ideas, by defining the key characteristics of a given polity, **shape** both its **domestic politics** (since they are tied to a particular set of norms and principles of governance that are recognized as consistent with “who we are”) and its **foreign policy** (since through an identification of national distinctiveness vis-à-vis other states in the international system, definitions of state identity position the self relative to other countries and enable decision makers to identify friends and enemies in the international arena). Useful **indicators of change** in the definition of national identity include the emergence of **new intersubjective ideas** about the key characteristics of the given polity (e.g., **new understandings of the collective self**, the purpose of its basic institutions, and the nature of “correct” norms of governance) and a new conception of the **relationship between** the national **self** and the **outside world** (such as a rearticulation of the self’s particular position—identification with, similarity to, difference from, or even opposition to various international others, and the purpose of the self in the context of interactions with those different others).

**Role-playing frameworks literally brainwash us into adopting Western norms---social psychology.**

**Gheciu 05**, Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance and the liberal order, the Global Right, state (re)building, and International Relations theory., (Alexandra, “NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War”, Stanford University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780804767668>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

**Role-playing**, I suggest, can be seen as part of a **process of habitus-building**, for, as Bourdieu explained, habitus is not simply a set of conceptual categories. Rather, as a set of dispositions which are acquired through a process of **inculcation** that incline agents to act and react in certain ways, habitus refers to a whole set of relations to the world, from conceptual frameworks, to bodily expressions (bodily hexis, incorporating specific ways of speaking, moving, etc.), to behavioral dispositions and ethical principles. The acquisition of **new behavioral dispositions**— in this case, I argue, **via role-playing**—is an important part of the socialization of individuals into the culture of a given community or social group. As Bourdieu argued, the behavioral dispositions inculcated in people lead them to **act or react in specific ways**—as if those ways were simply natural. In his examination of Bourdieu’s habitus, John Thompson pointed out that it is “because the body has become a repository of **ingrained dispositions** that certain actions, certain ways of behaving and responding, seem altogether natural.”42

**Social psychologists** have long argued that role-playing is one of the most effective ways through which society influences the **behavior**, but ultimately also the **attitudes** and **self-images** of its members.43 According to analysts of religious conversion, for instance, people often “act themselves” into roles prescribed by particular religious beliefs.44 The explanation provided by social psychologists is that individuals’ own behavior will be used by them as a source of evidence of their beliefs and attitudes. By **engaging in activities** typically **associated with a certain** social **role**, people will come to identify with the role and will tend to accept the “duties” and appropriate norms of behavior prescribed for that role.

A surprising finding of social psychology is that even people whose initial worldview is in tension with the ideas underlying the roles they enact may, in the aftermath of role-playing, **change the way in which they perceive** themselves and understand others. For instance, marriage counselors and mediators in labor-management disputes commonly advise parties to a dispute to play the role of those with whom they are in conflict. The idea is that, by doing the things that other actors habitually do, participants in role-playing will change their perceptions of those others, and, on this basis, also **re-evaluate themselves**.45

Although, to date, theorists of world politics have not shown great interest in it, I suggest that role-playing plays an interesting role in **international socialization** practices. In our case, we can talk of the occurrence of **role-playing** in situations in which **NATO** places Central and Eastern European actors in positions in which they have to act as if they were members of the alliance, emulating allied attitudes and behavior, performing the tasks that allied officers and civilian officials are expected to carry out. In the case of post–Cold War NATO, a **close analysis** of activities involving Central and Eastern European actors—particularly young military and civilian experts—reveals a **repeated use** of role-playing aimed at conveying to those actors the **“Western way of doing things”** in civil-military relations and, more broadly, in **security-related matters**. Particularly in the context of Partnership for Peace (PfP) courses, IFOR and KFOR operations in the Balkans, and NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly seminars, Central/Eastern Europeans were required to adopt actively the role of liberal democratic decision makers or military officers. **Role-playing** enacted in the **framework** of PfP programs was carried out in pursuit of NATO’s goal of extending “to others in Europe what NATO has achieved among its member nations—a common defense culture and the elimination of war as an accepted instrument of national policy.”46 Indeed, organizers of PfP courses and other programs pointed out that they placed special emphasis on cultivating in partners the kind of behavior associated with the NATO way of doing things, and “eventually establishing the same kind of habits of cooperation with partners that have long existed among the allies.”47

Role-playing exercises often occurred in the context of **simulated crises** or other situations **calling for extensive cooperation** between political and military authorities, and between those authorities and society. Typically, Central/Eastern European socializees were asked to (pretend to) make decisions and act in accordance with liberal democratic principles of the rule of law, democratic control of security/defense institutions, and respect for the basic human rights of the individuals involved in, or affected by, the presumed “crises.” For instance, they were asked to emulate their Western peers in finding and implementing solutions that respected a constitutional framework of inviolable liberal rights of civilians (as opposed to, for instance, arbitrary suspension of the right to freedom and property). Such instances of role-playing were designed to cultivate in Central/Eastern European socializees the **habit** of acting in accordance with **Western-prescribed norms**, and, hence, indirectly, to cultivate in them the **“right” dispositions** in terms of normative references used as guidelines in decision-making and implementation. I suggested earlier that, to the extent that socialization is effective, it will lead socializees to **internalize** the **new norms**—that is, to take them for granted, regard compliance with them as the right thing to do, and **reject alternative norms** as unacceptable. From this (constructivist) perspective, norm internalization means that the socializees will **(re)define their identity** and interests in accordance to those norms, and will **reject** interpretations of interests that involve **violations** of those norms.48 If the new norms have been internalized, the socializees will uphold them consistently, in various forums and in diverse circumstances, even at the risk of incurring material costs. They will promote the new norms as the right thing to do, rather than engage in a cost-benefit analysis in each decisionmaking instance in order to decide whether or not a certain norm should be accepted or rejected—which is what they should do if they were no more than strategic manipulators of those norms.

**Read this vs novices.**

* (idk what this card is saying I just thought it was slightly funny)

**Gheciu 05**, Alexandra Gheciu is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance and the liberal order, the Global Right, state (re)building, and International Relations theory., (Alexandra, “NATO in the 'New Europe': The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War”, Stanford University Press, <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780804767668>) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In their recent work, constructivist scholars like Jeffrey Checkel and Thomas Risse point out that persuasion is more successful when the actors involved act within the framework of a Habermasian “common lifeworld,” consisting of a shared system of understandings and norms perceived as legitimate.34 This is an important finding. But I suggest that, particularly **in situations when** “**novices**” **are involved**, it is useful to start analyses of international socialization at an earlier stage—that in which socializees are brought into a given cultural framework. In the context of the present study, NATO-sponsored persuasion complemented—and sometimes relied on—**pedagogical practices** through which representatives of the organization sought to teach Central and Eastern Europeans a particular set of (**Western defined**) **ideas, norms, and principles**. From this perspective, teaching can be seen as an attempt to **project** into Central and Eastern Europe the **common lifeworld** of the Euro-Atlantic community, consisting of shared liberal ideas and norms.35 If successful, this pedagogic effort will lead to a situation in which Central/Eastern Europeans come to share the collective interpretations of the world, and of legitimate norms and rules that prevail among NATO’s members. In turn, this should facilitate **subsequent arguing** between NATO members and Central/Eastern European partners, by providing them with a repertoire of collective understandings within which they can **articulate truth claims.** I argue that, particularly in interactions with pro-reform Czech and Romanian political elites, NATO officials often sought to teach liberal norms, then tried to persuade socializees to enact particular institutional and legislative reforms by portraying those reforms as the right way of translating the new norms into practice.